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1 Introduction
According to Bordo and James (2008) who closely examine the demise of the Latin and
Scandinavian monetary unions, multinational monetary unions have mainly dissolved due
to exogenous external shocks, such as World War I. Hence, the considerations of external
shocks should be put at the forefront in assessing the sustainability of a monetary union.
However, most of the traditional literature on Optimum Currency Areas (OCA) has
focused on adjustment mechanisms occurring inside a monetary union and investigate
what would happen after the introduction of a new currency should an asymmetric shock
hit. The recent literature, following Frankel and Rose (1997, 1998), also states in general
that countries not forming an optimum currency area ex ante could undergo a reorga-
nization of production activities inside the union's borders, driving them closer to the
reference point by reducing the asymmetry of real output movements. Thus, the liter-
ature has traditionally focused on what would happen inside the monetary union as a
potential threat to its existence, whereas historical evidences point to the fundamental
role of external shocks in the break-up of monetary unions.
In this paper, we o®er a reductio ad absurdum argument to support historical ev-
idences described in Bordo and James (2008). Speci¯cally, we examine the condition
under which a monetary union can survive the impacts of external shocks. Our model
focuses on the di®erent degrees of sensitiveness among union members towards common
external shocks. The sources of such di®ering sensitivities have been listed by Dornbusch
et al. (1998) for instance. In this note, we analytically account for their in°uences upon
the sustainability of a monetary union.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model upon which our
argument rests. The following section describes several features of our monetary union,
and Section 4 investigates the condition for the monetary union to be sustainable in the
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presence of external shocks. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
Our model basically consists of a description of the economic structure of a monetary
union and speci¯cation of policy-making bodies' preferences. In this section, we ¯rst
describe the situation under autonomy and compute each policy-maker's optimal interest
rate as a function of each country's characteristics.
2.1 Economy
For the simplicity of exposition, we assume that the union consists of 2 economies, indexed
by j = 1; 2: The aggregate demand of an economy j is described by the following equation:
ydj;t = ¡® (it ¡ ¼j;t) ; (1)
where ydj;t; it; and ¼j;t are respectively the aggregate demand, the interest rate and the
in°ation rate of this economy at time t, whereas ® is a positive parameter:
On the other hand, each economy's aggregate supply is given by a Lucas-type supply
function where unexpected in°ation boosts its output:
ysj;t = ¯ (¼j;t ¡ ¼et ) + !jÀt; (2)
where ysj;t and ¼
e
t are the aggregate supply and the expected in°ation rate, while Àt
represents period t's supply shock, originating from the rest of the world, and !j is
a positive parameter and signi¯es country j's sensitivity to this shock.1 Also, ¯ is a
1We do not consider national (or regional, or sectorial) shocks as well as any demand shocks. Incorpo-
rating them would make the algebra more tedious, without additional implications of great signi¯cance.
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parameter with a positive value. In equilibrium, we have
¼j;t =
1
¯ ¡ ® (¡®it + ¯¼
e
t ¡ !jÀt) ; (3a)
yj;t =
¯
¯ ¡ ®
µ
¡®it + ®¼et ¡
®
¯
!jÀt
¶
: (3b)
Here, we suppose ® < ¯ so as to rule out an unrealistic behavior of in°ation in terms
of its determinants. The two local economies di®er from each other only with respect to
their individual sensitivities to the rest-of-the-world shock. We suppose that the shock is
normally distributed with a well-de¯ned variance and a zero mean.
2.2 Policy-makers
In this model, monetary policy is decided by a federal college, consisting of country
representatives, which we also refer to as \governors." In order to focus on the impact of
shocks, we discard di®erences over their preferences, and thus suppose that representatives
agree on the objectives to be followed. Namely, they all target the same in°ation rate
and the same output level.
Accordingly, the objective of each representative central banker (governor) is to min-
imize the following loss function:
Gj;t =
1
2
(¼j;t ¡ ¼¤)2 + ¸
2
(yj;t ¡ y¤)2 ; (4)
where we assume that the desired in°ation rate and output level (¼¤ and y¤) are identical
Moreover, focusing on the federal supply shock reinforces the link between our setup and historical
evidences on some monetary unions demises, principally triggered by a price variation in an oversea
commodity market, for instance. On the other hand, demand shocks can probably be considered safely
as originating (and be managed) mostly from within a union, notably through the use of ¯scal instru-
ments.
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across all the governors.2 Moreover, we suppose exactly the same preference for the
monetary delegates (identical ¸), for the sake of simplicity. The assumption of a common
in°ation objective across the union does not seem too unrealistic for countries sharing
(or considering to share) the same currency. Thus, we can normalize these desired values
as ¼¤ = y¤ = 0.3
To complete the model, the timing of policy-making decisions has to be speci¯ed.
Here, we consider that private agents form their expectations ¯rst, and the values of the
shock is subsequently revealed. Then, the monetary authority sets its policy rate. Finally,
transactions take place, which determines the levels of output and in°ation.
2.3 Optimal policy under autonomy
We start by deriving our benchmark case, i.e., what happens if a country lives outside
the monetary union? Even such an autonomous case does not indicate autarky and the
country is not immune from rest-of-the-world shocks. Moreover, it may su®er from even
larger shocks than when it is a member of the monetary union since the relative size of
the outside world increases when staying out. In order to simplify the discussion here,
we assume that the sensitivity to external shocks under autonomy is the same as when
being inside the monetary union.
To determine each policy-maker's optimal interest rate, it su±ces to notice that the
model is fully symmetric around zero. Therefore, the expected in°ation rate can only
be equal to zero. For each local economy, the preferred policy is therefore obtained by
2Alternatively, y¤ can be considered as the di®erence between the desired and the natural output
growth rates. Here, this would simply mean that, while economies may have di®erent natural output
growth rates, the policy-makers try to minimize the gap between the actual and the optimal growth
rates.
3Note that, as we are interested solely in computing the parameter conditions for a monetary union
to be sustainable, this simpli¯cation about structurally deterministic components is inocuous while it
simpli¯es the algebra signi¯cantly.
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minimizing her loss function over ij;t, while assuming that the expected in°ation rate is
equal to zero. This is the interest rate that that governor would choose to implement if
monetary policy was independently decided. Inserting this interest rate in equations (3a)
and (3b), one obtains
¼Aj;t = ¡
¸¯
1 + ¸¯2
!jÀt; (5a)
yAj;t =
1
1 + ¸¯2
!jÀt; (5b)
where the subscript A signi¯es \autonomy."
It is obvious from (5a) and (5b) that an external shock a®ects di®erent countries
di®erently, depending on the degrees of sensitivity, !j. Hence, even though we assume
that the countries have similar preferences and objectives, monetary policy would need to
be tailored to their individual needs, due to the di®erentiated impacts of external shocks,
which are asymmetrically felt between the respective member states. An example of the
situation we have in mind is the e®ects of an oil shock, which would be symmetric at
origin but felt di®erently across nations, depending on a country's import dependence,
industrial structures, climate, and so on.
The existence of this idiosyncratic part of the common shocks implies that each mem-
ber economy of a union could su®er from a common monetary policy. The following
section investigates this possibility.
3 Life in a monetary union
In a monetary union, the decisions over the interest rate are made by a monetary policy
body that is interested not just in the situation of any single country in particular but also
in the union's welfare as a whole. Such a body's preference is described by the following
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loss function:
Gft =
1
2
³
¼ft ¡ ¼¤
´2
+
¸
2
³
yft ¡ y¤
´2
; (6)
where ¼ft and y
f
t are respectively the weighted averages of the member countries' in°ation
rates and output levels,4 and the superscript f indicates the case where the interest rate
is chosen by a (federal) policy-maker with a union-wide objective. In the two-country
situation, we can write these as
¼ft = ½¼1;t + (1¡ ½)¼2;t; (7a)
yft = ½y1;t + (1¡ ½) y2;t; (7b)
where ½ (½ 2 [0; 1]) is the relative weight assigned to country 1.
Invoking the assumptions of ¼¤ = y¤ = 0, the minimization of this loss function under
the constraint of the expressions in (7a, b), which determines the union's in°ation rate
and output level, leads to the following optimal interest rate:
ift = ¡
1 + ¸®¯
® (1 + ¸¯2)
(½!1 + (1¡ ½)!2) Àt: (8)
Hence, the union's monetary policy reacts to the external shocks, considering its members'
idiosyncrasies, and weighting them accordingly. By plugging this interest rate into the
expression of each country's in°ation rate and output level, we can describe the impact
of the union's policy on the economy of the union as follows:
4This assumption is relatively standard in the literature as a union's objective. For di®erent formu-
lations, see Aaron-Cureau and Kempf (2006), for example.
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¼ft = ¡ (½!1 + (1¡ ½)!2)
®¸¯
(1 + ¸¯2)
Àt; (9a)
yft = (½!1 + (1¡ ½)!2)
®
1 + ¸¯2
Àt: (9b)
4 Sustainability condition
When does remaining inside a monetary union turn out to be unbearable for one of its
member countries? In order to answer this question, one has to compare the welfare of
a monetary union member to what would happen if that country had not entered the
union in the ¯rst place. Adopting country 1's point of view, the following condition has
to be met for a monetary union to be bene¯cial:
E(Gf1) < E(G
A
1 ): (12)
That is, the expected loss incurred under a monetary union needs to be smaller than the
one under autonomy. Based on this condition, we can derive the following proposition:
Proposition. The relatively more sensitive country to external shocks is better o® by
remaining in the monetary union.
Proof. From equations (5, a and b) and (9, a and b), we can derive that (12) is equivalent
to the following condition for country 1:5
(½!1 + (1¡ ½)!2)2 < (!1)2 , !2 < !1
5Note that we restrict our attention to only positive !'s.
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From the last inequality, the proposition above readily follows. Q.E.D.
Proposition above immediately leads to the following statement:
Corollary. As the above condition has to hold for each candidate country, a monetary
union is inherently unsustainable under external shocks.
Proof. The condition, !1 < !2, must be met for country 2 to remain in the monetary
union. Obviously, the two conditions for respective nations cannot be satis¯ed simulta-
neously. Q.E.D.
It needs to be added that this result depends partly on the simplicity of our model: (i)
countries share exactly the same preferences, (ii) the members' economies are hit only
by external shocks, and (iii) monetary policy is the only stabilization instrument. More-
over, even if a country is worse o® by remaining inside a monetary union with respect to
external shocks alone, its expected net bene¯t from forming a monetary union can still
be positive when other bene¯ts, such as a decrease in transaction costs, overwhelm the
e®ects of external shocks.
Yet, when our assumptions hold true in general, the outlook of a union is quite
gloomy. The proposition indicates that the more open economy will pro¯t more from the
stabilizing impact of monetary policy, and wish to share the currency of the less exposed
economy. As this cannot be true for all the member nations, our argument reveals the
inherent di±culty in maintaining a monetary union against external shocks.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we show that the sustainability of a multinational monetary union must
face an inherent problem as far as external shocks are concerned, which o®ers a theoreti-
cal foundation to Bordo and James's (2008) historical argument. It has to be noted that
this result is not a restatement of McKinnon's (1963) criterion, as we here consider the
sensitivity against the external shocks, not the degree of openness. These two concepts
are quite di®erent: a country which is very open to the rest of the world, such as Belgium,
conducts the larger part of its international trade with the European Union, yet it is still
very sensitive to the variations of oil prices. Hence, in order to be sustainable, a mone-
tary union should gather nations whose sensitivity to external shocks from the rest of the
world is relatively low. This can also be interpreted as a generalization of Kenen's (1969)
diversi¯cation criterion to include sensitivities to external shocks of member nations. It
also o®ers an criterion for nations that are considering to join existing multilateral mon-
etary unions, such as the European Monetary Union, or prospective unions, such as the
Gulf Cooperation Council.
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